Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez may well go down
in history as a
brilliant tactician. Each time after he threatens his political adversaries,
Chavez backs off and announces his willingness to reach a compromise. The
opposition has generally reacted by breathing a sigh of relief and accepting
the President's olive branch. However, Chavez has not lost sight of his goal:
the revolutionary transformation of the nation's political system.
Chavez holds the establishment parties
responsible for the entrenched privileges and corruption that have
characterized Venezuelan democracy since its outset in 1958. Most important,
official incompetence and party patronage doomed the plans for the state to
spearhead industrial development. Thus, the state-run steel and aluminum
complexes built largely by the oil windfall money of the 1970s were touted at
the time as the road for third world countries to follow. The companies,
however, were run into the ground. Over the last two years, Venezuela attempted
to sell them off but the multinationals, wary of the heavy debts, padded
employee rolls and pending ecological obligations, offered Venezuela but a
pittance.
Chavez first raised the banner of a new
constitution to revamp the nation's
ossified democracy when he staged an unsuccessful coup in February 1992,
and again when he won the presidential election last December with 56 percent
of the vote (see "Man of the People," March 21, 1999). His broadside attacks
against the establishment parties struck a responsive chord, particularly among
underprivileged. Upon taking office, Chavez decreed elections for a constituent
assembly to rewrite the 1961 Constitution, which in many ways privileged the
political parties. On July 25, Chavez's "Patriotic Pole" coalition won almost
all of the 131 seats in the assembly.
With an absolute hold over the assembly, the
Chavistas were set on dissolving Congress, a bastion of the traditional
political parties. In its first month, the assembly circumscribed the power of
the Congress and state legislatures. It also oversaw the review of 3130 cases
of formal denunciation of judges, which had been set aside over the years. They
kicked off their work firing 8 of them, promising dozens of more dismissals to
come.
On August 27, several hundred members of
Democratic Action (AD), the
largest opposition party, accompanied a group of congressmen attempting to hold
an emergency session of Congress against the wishes of the Chavistas. Singing
their party anthem and chanting, "AD is in the streets, and we're not afraid,"
they clashed with Chavez's followers near the national capitol.
At the time, the
New York Times
, echoing reports in the U.S. media in general, editorialized that the
constituent assembly was "trying to take over the functions of government." The
Times concluded: "It is hard to see how the Jacobin decisions of Mr. Chavez and
the assembly will help Venezuela." State Department spokesmen, after having
refrained from criticizing Chavez since his election, also warned of grave
threats to the separation of powers in Venezuela. Chavez reacted by calling the
Times piece a "gigantic lie," while one of his party's major leaders suggested
that it was designed to pressure Venezuela into kowtowing to the U.S. The
Constituent Assembly decided to investigate an international campaign to blur
Venezuela's democratic image.
Chavez eventually retreated. In early September,
he advised his followers in
the Constituent Assembly to negotiate with Congress. In doing so, the
assembly agreed to recognize congressional powers and to refrain from
removing governors and mayors accused of corruption. On Sept. 21-22, Chavez met
with President Clinton in New York and spoke at the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, where he talked of "nation al consensus," a
term indicative of his turn to moderation.
A number of hard-liners in the Constituent
Assembly--including ex-military
rebels who had supported Chavez in a second coup attempt in November 1992 --
criticized the President's turnabout. Chavez responded that, given the recent
electoral blows received by the establishment parties, further attacks were
superfluous. What was important was getting down to the business of drafting
the new constitution, which is to guide Venezuela into a new era of
participatory democracy.
As part of this new tack, Chavez ordered his
followers in the assembly to
concentrate efforts in the commissions rather than the plenary sessions,
where delegates are prone to lofty statements lashing out at the
establishment. The delegates are considering several models of government.
Regardless of which is chosen by the assembly and subsequently ratified by the
people in a national referendum, they each represent a clean break with the old
system of rule by party bosses.
One model would establish a powerful executive
branch. Various proposals
point in this direction: allowing for the immediate re-election of the
president, extending his term from five to six years in office, creating a
vice president or prime minister beholden to the president, and providing the
executive branch with a veritable majority on the national council in charge of
supervising elections.
Strengthening the presidency is a reaction to the
preponderance of
bureaucratically run parties that have been unresponsive to the needs of the
people. Chavez's style of frankness and direct contact with the people, as
well as his frequent and lengthy television appearances, lends credibility to
the
presidential model. "Venezuela has never had a President like this," says
Alejandro Silva, a pro-Chavez assembly delegate. "People now go to
Miraflores [the presidential palace], and although they don't always get a
chance to see Chavez, their grievances are recorded.. And what most
impresses them is that there is a follow-up. One of the President's men
actually gets back to them."
A second model, underpinned by the concept of
"popular sovereignty,"
would allow the people to elect and remove judges, the attorney general and
other figures whose job is to combat corruption and defend human rights. A
consensus exists among delegates in favor of instituting popular
referendums, not only to decide matters of prime importance, but to recall
elected officials. Luis Diaz, a top leader of Chavez's "Fifth Republic" party,
pointed out: "Under the old democracy, 10 or 15 city councilmen or state
legislators forced a mayor or governor out of office. It's the people who
should have the final word."
A third model, which is supported at least in
theory by the parties of the
ruling coalition, would transfer power from the central and state
governments to the municipal level. "It isn't practical to hold elections for
everyone and everything," says Nelson Rampersad, a leading member of the
pro-Chavez Movement Toward Socialism Party. "Decentralization has to
reach the localities where civil society constantly interacts with the
state." By example, he notes that Supreme Court judges should be selected on
the basis of merit by a national council chosen by university law schools and
lawyers associations, rather than be elected or named by the parties.
Many sectors of the population are prodding the
assembly to incorporate their
rights and benefits in the constitution. Street peddlers and other members of
the "informal economy," for instance, have gathered in front of the capitol,
where the assembly meets, calling for their inclusion in social security and
other worker programs. Similarly, the Indian population, which chose three
assembly delegates in special elections, is pushing for official
recognition of their native languages and dual citizenship for those who live
on the Colombian or Brazilian border.
Mobilization and participation is theoretically
what Chavez's brand of
democracy is all about. But the expectations and demands set in motion by
Chavez's movement are a double-edged sword. The real danger is that the
relatively weak parties that back Chavez will not be able to contain the
tremendous pressure unleashed from below. The resultant political convulsions
could lead in any number of undesirable directions.
Chavez's charisma is what enabled him to displace
political party rule. But the President is racing against time. A new political
system must be created and rules laid down before the opposition regroups or
Chavez's glamour wears off. In addition, the Venezuelan economy has been
victimized by uncertainty regarding the future, which has scared off private
investments. In the face of these imperatives, Chavez is pressuring for the
ratification of the new constitution before the year is out. If all goes
according to plan, Venezuelans will greet the new millenium with a clear break
with the past in the form of a novel democracy.
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