On December 15 1999, as Venezuelans voted to ratify the country's new
Constitution drafted by the followers of President Hugo Chávez, a devastating rainstorm killed an estimated 30,000 people. The coincidence of the reaffirmation of Chávez's power and the worst natural disaster of the century was too much for the President's adversaries to resist.
At a mass that Sunday, the Archbishop of Caracas, Ignacio Velasco,
attributed the floods to "the wrath of God" provoked by the arrogance of one individual. Months before, spokesmen for the Catholic Church had abandoned the hierarchy's long-standing avoidance of partisan politics by harshly criticizing Chávez and his new Constitution. They were particularly incensed that the document retreated from its predecessor's unequivocal defense of the right to life from the moment of conception.
In another departure from traditional neutrality, Venezuela's main
business organization, Fedecámaras, also actively campaigned against the
Constitution. Albis Muńoz, who spoke for the commercial sector, expressed fear that the Constitution pointed in the direction of a "Communist regime." (1) A number of profit-limiting measures roused the ire of the business sector, including
restrictions on the privatization of oil and social security, support for
job security, labor benefits for the self-employed and housewives, and a
more generous system of "retroactive" severance payments.
The assertive stance of the Catholic Church, Fedecámaras, and much of the communications media in the midst of an electoral contest is new for Venezuela. Corporate actors like the Church and the business sector have, in effect, stepped into the vacuum created by the collapse and loss of credibility of the two main establishment parties, the social democratic Democratic Action (AD) and the Social Christian Copei.
The marginal sectors of the population, which fervently support Chávez,
are now pitted against the old elites and the middle class, which since
Chávez's election in December 1998 have become increasingly hostile to
his government.
The polarization generated by Hugo Chávez comes in marked contrast to the
four decades of alternating rule of AD and Copei which produced no
meaningful differentiation between the two contending parties .
The old system dates back to the 1958 overthrow of dictator General
Marcos Pérez Jiménez and the signing of an accord between AD and Copei
(and a third center-left party which has since disappeared) called the
Pact of Punto Fijo .
In accordance with the deal, AD, which triumphed in the presidential
elections of that year, granted the losing parties of the Pact a "fair
share" of the spoils in the form of ministries and governorships in order
to avoid an embittered opposition. In addition to sharing power, the
parties agreed to establish a "mixed economy" with social protections and
to ally politically with the United States in the Cold War. The alliance
with the West meant the exclusion of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV)
and the left wing of AD, in spite of the heroic role played by both in
the resistance to Pérez Jiménez.
The system created by the Punto Fijo agreement, a "pacted democracy" that
created a certain political stability by shunting aside those who stood
for "destabilizing" radical reform, had long been extolled by political
scientists impressed by the stable resilience of the Venezuelan political
system. But recently, everyone from Hugo Chávez to many of the
once-laudatory political scientists blame Punto Fijo for establishing a
pattern of exclusion that kept new actors, including emerging social
groups and even the rank-and-file of AD and Copei, on the margin of
decision making. (2) Chávez now lashes out at "puntofijismo" for being
synonymous with elitist rule and the antithesis of the "participatory
democracy" his party claims to embrace.
Actually, clear signs of the erosion of Punto Fijo democracy had
presented themselves long before the Chávez victory of 1998. The mass
disturbances of February 27, 1989, set off by a sharp increase in public transportation and gasoline prices under President Carlos Andrés Peréz, demonstrated the extent to which the nation's poor resented the severe battering they had been taking throughout the 1980s. Three years later, the abortive coup led by Chavez on February 4, 1992 and another that broke out 10 months later indicated that anger had also built up in the mid-level ranks of the armed forces. In the 1993 presidential elections, for the first time since 1958, a candidate who had split from the bipartisan pact and formed a center-left coalition called Convergencia won the presidential elections, with AD and Copei polling a combined vote of less than 50%.
The final display of disenchantment came in the 1998 elections when the
popularity of each presidential candidate was directly proportional to
the degree to which he or she was able to convincingly articulate an
anti-pacted-democracy discourse. Chávezšs main opponent, Henrique Salas
Romer, who had positioned himself as a centrist anti-party independent,
lost credibility when just a week before the elections AD and Copei
openly declared their support for his candidacy.
In the political battles following his election as president, Chávez
adroitly exploited polarization by harping on the presence of AD and
Copei in the enemy camp in order to undermine the cedibility of his
adversaries. Polarization over the "Yes" and "No" vote in the December 15
ratification of the new Constitution left little space for nuanced
positions. "Chávez conjures up the bogeyman of old-time, corrupt
politicians and political cliques, even though the traditional parties
are largely out of the picture," said Eduardo Pozo, a leader of the newly
formed party, Democratic Left (ID), a split-off from Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS), one of Chávez's allies. ID and some other center-
leftist groups had the unenviable task of campaigning against the new
Constitution while attempting to keep AD and Copei at arm's length. "He
creates distrust toward people like ourselves who formulate criticisms
from a progressive perspective," complained the ID leader. (3)
As this article is written, Venezuelans are bracing for yet another round
of elections in which elected offices from the presidency down to local mayoralties and neighborhood juntas are up for what Chávez has called "relegitimation." These "mega-elections" were meant to take place within two months of the December Constitutional ratification, but the catastrophic flooding forced postponement. In the interim, the political landscape has been altered.
First, the added time has allowed latent conflicts within Chávez's party,
the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), to come to the surface. The uneasy
coalition between military comandantes and civilian political activists
that formed the party's base has fractured, and one of the President's
closest military comrades-in-arms, Francisco Arias Cárdenas, has not only
left the MVR, but has declared himself to be a rival candidate for the
presidency. Second, divisions within the broader pro-Chávez electoral
alliance Patriotic Pole, which includes the smaller parties MAS and Homeland for All (PPT), have developed.
The defection of Arias Cárdenas, the second in command during the February 4, 1992 military uprising, changes the political landscape by creating a credible
"anti-Punto Fijo" opposition. As twice-elected governor of the oil-rich state of Zulia, Arias took a hard-line approach to the clientelism long practiced by the traditional parties by deleting the names of party activists from public payrolls and even purging the state's Metropolitan Police of party loyalists.
He has adroitly shunned association with the old discredited parties, and
accepts endorsement only from nontraditional organizations. Indeed, he vetoed the proposal made by some of his supporters that he endorse AD gubernatorial candidates in various states. Despite his careful positioning of himself to the right of Chávez, he has nonetheless accepted the backing of ID, the left-leaning Radical Cause (Causa R) and even the small ultra-leftist Red Flag party.
Nevertheless, Arias faces credible charges that he is a surrogate of the corrupt traditional parties. As soon as he announced his intention to run for the presidency, the pro-AD candidate Antonio Ledezma withdrew from the race. Though Ledezma firmly denies that he supports Arias, and Arias does not acknowledge his support, the candidate has received backing from no less a symbol of the "old politics" than ex-President Carlos Andrés Pérez.
Prior to Arias' exit from the MVR, the polarization between Chavistas and anti-Chavistas masked a complex political setting in which both the governing Patriotic Pole and the opposition were deeply divided. Now fragmentation and internal conflict are very much out in the open.
The roots of the MVR itself are particularly heterogeneous. Most of those
who entered Chávez's movement following the 1992 coup attempts came from
the periphery of a host of leftist and ultra-leftist organizations. They
admired Chávez for having dared place the attainment of state power on
the agenda, in sharp contrast with the rest of the left which had opted
for electoral politics following the guerrilla period of the 1960s. (4)
Then, in April 1997, when the Chavista movement abandoned its policy of
electoral abstentionism by deciding to participate in the national
elections of 1998, it began to attract rank-and-file members of AD and
Copei, disenchanted with their respective parties as a result of rampant
corruption and the failure to devise any convincing strategy of economic
development.
On the eighth anniversary of the February 4, 1992 attempted coup, Arias
Cárdenas, along with two other former comandantes of the uprising, Yoel
Acosta Chirinos and Jesús Urdaneta, issued a manifesto calling on Chávez
to stay true to the coup's ideals. Speaking in the coastal city of Coro,
Venezuela's original capital, the three comandantes called on Chávez to
distance himself from certain politicians associated with the political
practices of the past and to deepen the struggle against corruption.
Specifically, they pointed the finger at the president of the interim
Congress, Luis Miquilena, and Foreign Relations Minister José Vicente
Rangel, two veteran leftist politicians who they felt had monopolized the
ears of the President.
While the comandantes leveled charges of petty corruption against
Miquilena , it was widely understood that deep political resentments were at the basis of the charges. During the restoration of public order following the floods, for example, Rangel had supported the investigation of alleged human rights violations committed by the country's political police who were under Urdaneta's command. Chávez showed little sympathy for his old comrades' charges and, in fact, he chastised the comandantes for having gone public at the outset of an electoral campaign rather than channeling their critique internally. Nevertheless, he did commit himself to investigating 46 corruption charges formulated by Urdaneta while he was still head of the political police.
The incident reflected several very real sources of conflict. The MVR had
been subject to increasing tension between those who favor a strong
presence of retired and active military officers in the government and
those wary of such a trend. Some MVR supporters applaud the discipline of
officers as a much needed corrective to civilian inefficiency and point
to the general prestige of the armed forces in sharp contrast to the
disrepute of most civilian political institutions. Others are wary of the
officers' top-down style, and worry about their growing influence. (5)
Indeed, until the split among the comandantes the number of officers
Chávez had named to top government posts was on the increase, presumably
because the internal rivalry and factionalism among the civilian
politicians of his movement made them less dependable. In addition,
Chávez's much-touted public works program "Plan Bolívar 2000" had been
reduced mainly to the work of soldiers, and allocations for the program
were channeled through the army at the state level. Finally, at the
outset of the campaign for the May elections, retired officers sought MVR
endorsements as gubernatorial candidates in as many as 18 of the nation's
23 states.
Chávez skillfully calmed fears of militarization and strong-man rule by
naming Isaías Rodríguez, a well-liked civilian and relative new-comer to the MVR, as vice-president, a position created by the new Constitution. One of the three comandantes, Acosta Chirinos, let Chávez know in private of his disappointment that Arias had been bypassed.
At the outset of his presidential campaign, Arias distanced himself from
Chávez's policies, placing himself clearly to the right of his former
comrade-in-arms. "We are constructing our revolution here," said Arias in
reference to Chávez's friendship with Fidel Castro, "and we do not need
advice from abroad." (6) In a subsequent interview he stated "I am not going to abandon Bolívar for Castro." (7) More important, Arias and those closest to him criticize Chávez's redistributive policies and conflictive style for scaring off the foreign capital so badly needed to revitalize the economy.
Arias' criticisms of the government have not been the only ones to
originate from within the ranks of Chavismo. One of the movement's
strengths has been its success in drawing in nationally prestigious
figures of distinct political outlooks, and Chávez has boasted from the
outset of the ideological heterogeneity of his movement, including, he
says, both "leftists" and "rightists."(8)
During the constitutional debates, for example, some of Chávez's supporters, such as journalist-turned politician Alfredo Peńa, felt that plans for privatization were moving too slow and opposed the proposed constitutional ban on the sale of state oil company stock. Following the flooding that began on December 15, Peńa called for the privatization of the international airport and port facilities of the state of Vargas, just outside of Caracas, in order to accelerate the area's recovery. Peńa formulated these and other proposals at the risk of being called, in his words, "an addict of neoliberalism." (9)
Other independents who were elected to the ANC on Chávez's ticket maintained a position of critical support for the president. Hermann Escarrá and Ricardo Combellas, two of the nation's leading experts on constitutional law, defended the proposed Constitution within the ANC from the criticism of Chávez's adversaries who claimed that the document promoted extreme centralism and concentration of power in the executive branch. The main concern of Escarrá and Combellas was that the Constitution went overboard in providing the Armed Forces autonomy by eliminating civilian checks, thus opening the doors to militarism. (10) At the time of the December 15 referendum, both had distanced themselves from the Chávez camp. Escarrá initiated a campaign to collect signatures for a referendum on 14 proposed constitutional amendments he drafted, which included a ban on abortions. He is now running for governor of the state of Carabobo with the support of Arias.
Differences within the ANC also manifested themselves among the main parties that form part of the "Polo Patriótico" coalition. The MAS party which stands to the right of the MVR unsuccessfully opposed Article 303 forbidding the sale of stock in the state-run petroleum company PDVSA. Nevertheless, President Chávez, concerned that the article would completely dry up foreign capital in the oil industry, insisted on leaving open the possibility of "strategic associations" and private investment in PDVSA's affiliates. A similar tug-of-war between MVR delegates and those of MAS occurred over articles on the legalization of abortion, state control of the social security system and reimplementation of the retroactive system of severance payment. In all three cases, Chávez urged moderation and the result was ambiguously worded articles, which provide escape hatches for those resistant to change. The newly created constitutional branch of the supreme court will have the final say on all matters of interpretation.
Contrasting opinions as to whether diversity should be encouraged or restrained divides MAS. While secretary-general Leopoldo Puchi has followed a policy of virtually unqualified support for the government, party president Felipe Mujica has favored a more critical tack and always left open the possibility of fielding separate candidates for the May elections. According to Mujica's right-hand man Nelson Rampersad, MAS's go-it-alone approach would benefit the party since "we are a more solid organization, have been around longer and enjoy greater credibility" than the MVR and PPT. (11)
The differences within the Patriotic Pole have persisted because no mechanisms exist to bridge them or to arrive at common goals and a common platform. The proposal formulated last year by Polo coordinator Eustoquio Contreras to coalesce into one party fell on deaf ears. Recently, the leftist PPT, irked by the unwillingness of MVR leaders to back three of its incumbent governors for reelection, has formally dropped out of the Patriotic Pole alliance. Nevertheless, the party continues to endorse Chávez as well as the Pole's gubernatorial candidates in eight states. As for MAS, a last minute agreement with MVR granting it three gubernatorial candidacies avoided a similar rupture, although MAS supporters are campaigning for the group's own slates in various states.
That the pro-leftist PPT, which shares a vision of radical change with the MVR, was shunted aside and not the more pragmatic MAS is telling. The electoral calculations of each party combined with the personal ambition of its leaders -- rather than ideological commitment -- is the order of the day.
The Pole's fragmentation has cut into Chávez's following, though he still
leads Arias Cárdenas in the polls. Maintaining popularity as Chávez has during his first year in office, in spite of the deepening of an economic crisis -- when unemployment reached 18 percent, the highest in fifteen years -- is an auspicious sign for any politician.
While the economies of many other Latin American nations have partially
recovered from the contraction of the 1980s, that of Venezuela has remained in a continued slump. Chávez's support is concentrated in the poor urban barrios, where the majority of the nation's population now resides.
Chávez's willingness to engage in dialogue with squatters and his boldness in threatening to expropriate unused land for industrial and agricultural purposes are popular with the poor. At the same time, his audacity in questioning the sacredness of private property makes the upper and middle classes tremble, the new Constitution's guarantees regarding property rights notwithstanding.
Chávez's concrete accomplishments after one year in office enhance his standing among voters in general. The nation's new constitution is innovative and far reaching, particularly in that it creates diverse forms for citizens to influence in decision making between elections. Furthermore, the removal of over 100 judges from office puts in evidence the government's seriousness about extirpating injustice and corruption. Finally, Venezuela's independent foreign policy, which contrasts with the submissiveness of its neighbors, reflects the nationalist sentiment of the Chavista movement. Indeed, Chávez deserves much of the credit for driving oil prices up, as was recently recognized by the rest of OPEC when it named Venezuela's Minister of Energy and Mines Alí Rodríguez president of the organization.
The internal tensions and contradictions within the MVR and the Patriotic
Pole have come to a head with the pronouncements of the three military
commanders. President Chávez has concentrated his efforts on political
reform during his first year in office and is now beginning to prioritize economic policy. After the mega-elections he will need to turn his attention to the consolidation and transformation of the MVR, as he pledged he would in the wake of the declaration of the three comandantes. Internal democracy and ideological direction are two imperatives that Chávez and his MVR can no longer postpone.
1. El Nacional, Nov. 23, 1999.
|